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Noel and Charles Roden Buxton write in the preface of their book, The War and the 
Balkans, that no one can deny the supreme importance of the Balkans in the European 
War.1 However, in spite of their contemporary statement, the assumed importance of the 
Balkans in the course of the Great War painstakingly faded away in the later memories of 
contemporaries as well as in historiography as well. As Keith Robbins pointed out that 
there are several accounts on the Dardanelles campaign but none investigated British Bal-
kan policy in 1914–1915 as a whole.2 In his glamorous book, David Dutton reconstructs the 
French–British policies in the Balkans between 1914 and 1918, but as a matter of fact, his 
analysis was made rather from the military’s point of view. Therefore, previous literature 
left enough room for further research into the diplomatic scrambles of 1914–1915. 
In my paper I am going to focus on the quasi-diplomatic mission of Noel and Charles 
Roden Buxton in the Balkans in 1914–1915 by analyzing the personal correspondence of 
Noel Buxton. Therefore, I will not be able to cover the British diplomacy as a whole. In the 
first part of my paper I briefly sum up the Buxtons i volvement in the affairs of the Balkan 
peninsula, and then I will provide a short overview of the period preceded the First World 
War. In the third part of this paper I will turn to the Buxton-mission of 1914–1915. 
The Buxtons and the Balkans prior to 1912 
British engagement with the European territories of the Ottoman Empire was particu-
larly strong throughout the 19th century. The well-known Easter Question connected Great 
Britain to the region despite it had not had crucial economic interest there. However, the 
fate of the withdrawing Ottoman Empire had raised political and strategic concerns among 
the great powers of Europe as the possible outcomes would have highly affected the deli-
cate contemporary balance of power in the region. 
The various Balkan nationalities gradually gained in ependence from the Porte during 
the 19th century. By the last third of the century, the Ottomans’ possessions in Europe were 
confined merely to Albania, Thrace, and to the areas which contemporaries usually referred 
to as Macedonia, a shifting and evolving term in both space and time.3 Contemporaries 
usually meant by Macedonia three Ottoman administrat ve units in Turkey-in-Europe: the 
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vilayets of Salonica, Monastir and Kosovo. Ottoman Macedonia was inhabited by various 
ethnic and religious communities which did not share  common national identity in a mod-
ern sense; they rather identified themselves in pre-modern terms such as religion and lan-
guage and other non-national loyalties.4 However, this population had become the main 
target of each of the neighboring Balkan states’ natio l propaganda, as they all claimed 
some parts of this territory according to their national unification programs. To this end, 
since the last third of the 19th century, a vast body of literature has been published by vari-
ous Balkan intellectuals and scholars in order to justify their rightful national claims for the 
territory both in their respective countries and in Western Europe too.5 
The role of public opinion gradually became a crucial factor in the conduct of foreign 
policy making in the 19th century.6 Influential segments of the Western European societies, 
such as journalists, scientists, politicians, etc., formed various lobby-groups in order to 
promote different causes or support various nationalities, and drew the attention of their 
government to these, and put the issue in the very midst of domestic public debates. After 
the turn of the 20th century numerous similar groups were formed to promote just the cause 
of the Balkan nationalities. As one prominent British journalist at the time, Henry Nevinson 
noted that “every English person who knows anything at all about them has adopted one or 
other of the Balkan races as a favourite pet.”7 In the pre-World War period one of the most 
important group of this kind was the Balkan Committee which was founded by Noel and 
Charles Roden Buxton in 1902.8 The Committee’s main goal was to make the British Gov-
ernment (and the Concert of Europe) to compel the Ottoman Empire to introduce reforms in 
its land inhabited by Christians. Just before the well-known Ilinden Uprising of 2 August 
1903 the Committee launched its agitation campaign which, however, highly resembled the 
great Bulgarian Agitation of William E. Gladstone in 1876. Noel Buxton and the Balkan 
Committee tried to keep the Macedonian question in the center of British political discourse 
for almost a decade. Although the group ventured to maintain an outward appearance of 
unity, in reality the Committee was deeply divided along (Balkan) national lines. Generally 
the Balkan Committee was regarded as a Bulgarophil organization.9 By the time of the 
overwhelming victory of the Balkan Alliance in the first Balkan War, the Balkan Commit-
tee became as divided as the Balkan countries themselves. 
The prelude to World War I: The Balkan Wars 1912–1913 
As Richard C. Hall points out, the Balkan Wars were a hearsal to the Great War in many 
sense: the using of rapid-fire artillery; trench warfare, the extensive impact of the war on the 
civilian population, all these would be the characteris ics of the coming European war.10 In 
regard of my topic, it is important because it fundamentally determined the relationship be-
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tween the Balkan states, and this also hampered the Entente’s room of diplomatic maneuver 
in the first years of World War I. The Balkan Alliance of 1912, which was made up mostly 
under Russian patronage, was a result of a series of bilateral treaties concluded between the 
Balkan countries. Contrary to the original Russian design, the Balkan bloc’s aim was to ‘lib-
erate’ the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. However, by the eve of the war the 
concluded arrangements, except the Serbo–Bulgarian Treaty, dimly outlined the territorial 
distribution of the future war spoils, and left this question open until the end of hostilities. 
The First Balkan War started on 8th October 1912 by Montenegro, and soon the rest of 
the Balkan allies declared war on the Ottomans too. After a couple of weeks of fighting, the 
Ottomans suffered a devastating defeat from the alli s, and by the time of the truce of 3rd
November, they lost almost all of their European possessions, and their control actually was 
confined to three major fortifications, namely, Scutari, Janina and Edirne.11 Due to the pres-
sure exerted by the Great Powers, the belligerent countries met in London to negotiate the 
terms of peace. Parallel to this, another conference was held at St. James Hall by the am-
bassadors of the Powers in order to settle questions raised by the unexpected victory of the 
Balkan states. 
Although the negotiations between the Balkan Alliance and the Ottomans were inter-
rupted and the war continued, the talks between the representatives of the Great Powers 
were keep going on. After serious debates, the ambassadorial conference decided to estab-
lish an autonomous Albania in December 1912. However, this decision jeopardized Serbia 
and Greece’s designs in this part of the peninsula, and this naturally led these countries to 
sought territorial compensation elsewhere, namely in Macedonia.12 The symptoms of grow-
ing discord between the allies were palpable already in the spring of 1913. The Serbian 
prime minister, Nikola Pašić raised the necessity of the modification of the Serbo–
Bulgarian Treaty as early as February 1913.13 James David Bourchier, the Balkan corre-
spondent of The Times, also noted the signs of rupture in a letter to Noel Buxton: “The truth 
is that the Servian officers finding themselves in possession at Monastir, etc., don’t see why 
they should go out, and regard treaties as waste pap r… The only remedy for the situation 
is arbitration is some form or other. Another campaign would be a scandal and a dis-
grace.”14 Finally, after the Scutari crisis the Great Powers demanded a complete cease-fire 
and peace negotiations were reopened in London. The Treaty of London, signed 30th May, 
settled many question which had arisen from the Ottoman defeat. Firstly, the Ottoman Em-
pire had to cede all its territories west from the so-called Enos–Midia line. The treaty also 
settled the status of Crete, and handed over most of the Aegean islands to Greece, and, as I 
mentioned earlier, an autonomous Albania was to be established.15 
Soon, however, the victorious Balkan allies ruptured over the spoils of war. Less than a 
month later the Balkan cooperation entirely collapsed. Feeling deprived from its “natural 
gains”, Bulgaria attacked its former allies on the night of 28–29th June: the second Balkan 
War begun. After some initial success the Bulgarian troops had to withdraw, and especially 
after Romania and the Ottoman Empire also entered th  conflict, the fate of the war was 
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decided. The representatives of the Balkan countries m t in Bucharest to discuss the details 
of the settlement. As Richard C. Hall noted, for Greece and Serbia, the treaty was a com-
plete success beyond their expectation. On the other hand, for Bulgaria it was a catastro-
phe.16 It lost vast territories in Macedonia, and it also had to cede the Southern Dobrudja to 
Romania, not to mention the recapture of Adrianople (Edirne) by Enver Pasha. On the eve 
of the Great War the Balkan countries had serious cnfli t of interests which made coopera-
tion between them almost inevitably impossible. 
The Buxton Mission in the Balkans 
At the outbreak of the war many Europeans shared th optimism of Emperor Wilhelm II 
that the war would be short, and the soldiers “will be home before the leaves have fallen 
from the trees”. However, both the Entente and the Central Powers attempted to win over 
new allies to their side in order to prevail in the world struggle. To this end, some British 
politicians were convinced that the key of victory laid “in the East”. During the year of 
1914, for British observers gradually realized that the Ottoman–German rapprochement 
eventually would be formalized in an alliance between them, which would have threatened 
basic British imperial interests, e.g. in Egypt. Although the Entente was keen to keep the 
Ottoman Empire out of the conflict, due to the conflicting interests of its diplomacy, finally, 
the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in September 1914.17 At this point the stance of the 
Balkan States became crucially important to both power blocs. Some members of this Brit-
ish Cabinet, and other British politicians alike, had thought that the best way to relieve the 
Western and Eastern fronts, and subsequently to win the war, was to open a new front in the 
Balkans. Naturally, Serbia was considered as an ally to the Entente powers, however, the 
rest of the Balkan states remained neutral. Winston Churchill aptly noted in his World War 
I memoirs that in 1914 there were equally strong groups of supporters of the Entente and of 
the Central Powers in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania too.18 In light of this, some quarter of 
British politicians started to emphasize the importance of a diplomatic mission to be sent to 
the Balkans in order to secure either support or, at le st, benevolent neutrality of those 
countries. However, the attempt to revive the Balkan bloc of 1912 proved to be a very diffi-
cult task due to, as I pointed out earlier, the results of recent events occurred in the Second 
Balkan War. 
The supporters of the “Eastern solution” within theBritish Cabinet, particularly David 
Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, First Lord of Admiralty, 
and Charles Masterman, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster – the latter was being the 
friend of the brothers – naturally sought the assistance of the main figures of the Balkan 
Committee, namely, Noel and Charles Roden Buxton, as they assumed that they could util-
ize the Buxtons’ networks in order to win over the n utral Balkan countries, particularly 
Bulgaria. As early as the end of August 1914, discus ions had started to decide that in what 
capacity should the Buxtons be sent to Bulgaria and what were the exact objectives of their 
visit. At the early stage of the war David Lloyd George was keen to open a new front in the 
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Balkans, and he [thought] that two factors were essential to make the Balkan countries 
commit themselves to the Entente cause: a vast loan and a military landing either in South 
Dalmatia or in Salonica.19 In a letter to Buxton, 22th August 1914, he authorized him to 
make credit arrangements with any Balkan country who decided to throw its lot with the 
Triple Entente.20 Churchill wrote a letter to Noel Buxton regarding this mission, in which 
he asked him to “make [his] friends in Greece and Bulgaria realize the brilliant but fleeting 
opportunity which now presents itself”.21 He claims that the Balkan states cannot expand 
without “internecine war”, but the “application of the principle of nationality in the south-
ern provinces of Austria-Hungary would produce results so advantageous to the Balkan 
states that the memory and the consequences of former quarrels could be assuaged for ever 
[sic!]. The creation of a Balkan Federation comprising Bulgaria, Servia, Roumania, Monte-
negro, and Greece, strong enough to play an effective part in the destinies of Europe, must 
be the common dream of all their peoples.”22 Notwithstanding that the abovementioned 
members of the Cabinet wanted a formal diplomatic mssion undertaken by the Buxton 
brothers, the Foreign Office did not shared their enthusiasm, and it did not support neither 
Lloyd George’s ‘blank cheque’ nor the official use of Churchill’s letter. Sir Edward Grey, 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, refused to send Buxton as a Special Agent, because in his 
view “in that capacity more harm than good might be done”, and Buxton should travel there 
in a purely private visit as “sympathetic friend of Bulgaria”.23 Keith Robbins argues that the 
Foreign Office reluctance to support Buxton’s mission ensued from two important factors. 
First, that from the very beginning of the war, theBritish diplomatic corps in Sofia regarded 
Bulgaria as already lost to the Entente. On the othr hand, the F.O. did not really like the 
idea that an outsider, a troublemaker to use A. J. P. Taylor’s phrase,24 penetrated into their 
domain of foreign policy making.25 
Eventually, Noel and Charles Roden Buxton had set off to Bulgaria in the early days of 
September 1914. Noel wrote in his diary about his feelings about the subsequent mission 
during the journey to Sofia: “It is horrible to urge a people to war, but it would be in Bul-
garia’s interest to do so, this being the best (and probably the last) opportunity of recover-
ing her rights. This war offers what has never been possible before and could not be gained 
without the curtailment of Austria-Hungary, namely a final and permanent solution of the 
Balkan question. Also, the entry of Bulgaria would have the most marked effect in shorten-
ing the war.”26 They arrived to Paris in the shadow of the German advance to the French 
capital, and continued their journey with several detours to Italy, to the port of Brindisi, 
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where to Churchill dispatched the HMS Hussar, a torpedo gunboat, at their disposal to 
swiftly sail off to Salonica.27 
Although, they were enthusiastically welcomed by the local populace of Sofia, the 
brothers found themselves in a very discouraging political atmosphere. King Ferdinand and 
the Radoslavov Government were generally considered as pro-German, and the Buxtons 
had connections mainly with the leading figures of the opposition, like former Bulgarian 
prime minister Ivan Gešov, but not with the governme t. Their primary objective was to 
ascertain “the price” of Bulgarian entry to war. Mosa Anderson, the biographer of Noel 
Buxton, suggests in her book that he and his brothe C arles actually outlined a territorial 
scheme for the Bulgarians in exchange for their commit ent to the Entente’s war aims,28 
despite the fact that, as I earlier pointed out, Sir Edward Grey did not authorized them to 
make such offers. According to Anderson the scheme promised to Bulgaria “(1) the central 
Macedonian districts which had been ascribed to Bulgaria under the Serbo–Bulgar Treaty 
in 1912; (2) certain districts in the Dobrudja, now ccupied by Rumania, and (3) in the 
event of Turkey entering the war against the Entente, the so-called Enos–Midia line. Bul-
garia in return was to promise benevolent neutrality to Serbia, Rumania and Greece”.29 […] 
Noel Buxton recorded a quite hostile attitude of the British diplomatic corps both at 
home and at Sofia as well. On the one hand, even before his departure from London, one of 
the highest officials of the Foreign Office suggested hat he could spare the trouble to going 
to Sofia as Bulgaria was already lost.30 On the other hand, he was convinced that the For-
eign Office drew the wrong conclusions from the “und ly pessimistic and misleading” re-
ports sent by Henry Bax-Ironside, British Minister in Sofia (1911–1915), who was regarded 
as a “friend of Serbia”, and thus he was very unpopular in Bulgarian political circles. Look-
ing back to the events of autumn 1914, he also notes in this letter to Robert Cecil, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1915–1919), that the First Secretary of the Sofia Le-
gation, “O’Reilly […] did much to diminish the unhappy effects thus produced. He was re-
called in the Spring on the ground that he had kept up social relations with Germans his 
wife being a German. His value as bringing the best and latest inside information might 
have been immense. It was precisely information that was wanted. But not only was he not 
put into the War Department (where his knowledge would be of daily use) but he was not 
even seen by Grey or Nicolson on his return.”31 Consequently, Buxton blamed the Foreign 
Office that the diplomatic corps had mismanaged this issue, and even regarded their work 
as amateurish. However, it is quite striking if we compare these observations with the 
memoirs of Sir Edward Grey. Although Grey’s memoir might be biased with the intention 
of self-justification, as all memoir might be, it seems he supported the idea of a revived 
Balkan bloc, though, as an experienced foreign policy maker, he saw also the great difficul-
ties of such policy. However, he recorded that “[…] if, as a result of the present war, Serbia 
obtained access to the Adriatic and a large acquisition of territory to the west of her inhab-
ited by Serbs, the settlement of the Macedonian question should thereby be made more 
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easy, and I saw very favourable possibilities as a consequence of this war”.32 All in all, in 
the light of the examined sources, it seems that British diplomacy in the Balkans was very 
indeterminate (at least on the surface), and apparently it worked rather half-heartedly to-
wards the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Entente side. Robbins also suggests that from the be-
ginning of 1914, behind the scenes, there was a struggle between Russia and Britain in 
Sofia for diplomatic supremacy.33 Noel Buxton wrote at a later date about his frustration 
over Grey and the Foreign Office’s reluctance to atain the cooperation of the Balkan coun-
tries: “It was more irritating to be encouraged to come, to leave all manner of work and also 
wife and family, to incur great efforts and expense, and (as it turned out) great dangers… 
and then to find that every suggestion for action either from ourselves or any other quarter 
was rejected and shelved, and generally that a steady stream of cold water was turned on so 
far as any forward policy was concerned.”34 
After a couple of weeks of negotiations, being disappointed in Grey’s decisions, the 
Buxtons left Sofia for Bucharest where they found a generally pro-Entente sentiment. How-
ever, as Buxton remarked to Cecil, according to the British Minister, Sir George Barclay 
(1912–1920), that as late as October the local governm nt had not been informed yet that 
Romania’s help would be welcome by Entente.35 They were also received by King Charles 
I (r. 1866–1914) and Queen Elisabeth who were very co dial with their English visitors but 
expressed their strong commitment to Germany. They also met with prominent Romanian 
politicians, such as Ion C. Brătianu, Take Ionesco, and certainly, the personnel from the 
British Legation.36 However, their stay in Romania was unexpectedly interrupted by the 
death of King Charles on 10th October 1914.37 On the morning of the royal funeral, 15th Oc-
tober 1914, the brothers were about to leave Bucharest by roofless car to one of their 
friend’s nearby estate when suddenly shots were fired on them. Noel Buxton had been shot 
through his jaw, and Charles was wounded on his chet, virtually the bullets went through 
his lungs. The assassin, a young, 21 years old Turkish student who studied political science 
and philosophy in Paris, Hassan Taksim was hold down by the driver of the car. They were 
brought back to their hotel room where a great crowd gathered to witness the brothers’ ag-
ony, and where a rather absurd and tragicomic scene occurred. Lady Grogan, the biogra-
pher of James David Bourchier, recorded in her book this moment as follows: “The 
wounded men were in a bad predicament, for, of the two other Englishmen present, the 
Minister, Sir George Barclay, was very short-sighted, and Bourchier extremely deaf. At 
last, Noel managed to gesticulate to Bourchier, whobrought him a scrap of paper on which 
Noel wrote a line telling him to clear the room. If Bourchier had not acted on these instruc-
tions immediately, there is little doubt that one of the brothers would have succumbed.”38 
Moreover, the Romanian gendarmeries brought to the hot l room the assassin as well in or-
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der to the Buxtons identify him. However, both of the brothers survived the assassination 
attempt, and spent about a month in a sanatorium near to the Romanian capital. 
From a letter that Noel Buxton wrote from the hospital to his wife we know that he was 
warned by Sir George Barclay because according to the intelligence provided by the British 
Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Louis Mallet (1913– 914), further attempts to murder 
them was expected.39 After recovery from their wounds the Buxtons paid  visit to their 
would-be assassin, Hassan Taksim in prison. Noel wanted to know his motivation behind the 
failed assassination, and he also suggested to Taksim that his action might help them, and in-
directly the cause of the Entente, in Bulgaria. Theyoung Turkish responded quite cheerfully 
to this assumption: “Then I shall receive a decorati n from the Balkan Committee!”40 
The brothers were received back in Bulgaria as natio l heroes who spilled their blood 
for the country.41 Unfortunately the sources are quite laconic about the happenings of the 
following weeks. What is certain is that the Buxtons went to Niš, where to the Serbian gov-
ernment and parliament fled from the Austro-Hungarian offensive, however, our sources 
are quite inconclusive whom they met there. However, it is quite clear that the brothers ar-
rived to Athens by the middle of December 1914. In a letter which never been sent to his 
wife, Noel Buxton still reports that they were feard from further assassination attempts. In 
this letter he also elaborates his personal motives about going to this mission and also about 
taking an active role in public life because he thought “partly because you are interested, & 
partly because (in addition) my friends, & especially my nephews & nieces, would like to 
hear them if I were killed”.42 However, his fears proved to be unreal and they continued 
their journey back to Great Britain via Rome43 and Paris where they discussed their experi-
ence with Georges Clemenceau who was then the editor of L’Homme Enchaîné, and Alex-
ander Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador to Paris.44 
Activities and Failure in London 
Upon their return back to Great Britain, the Buxtons thought that Bulgaria was still per-
suadable to join the Entente. Therefore, their nextgoal was to convince British political cir-
cles and public opinion alike about the utmost importance of bringing in Bulgaria to the 
war. In doing so, they utilized their earlier experience (and channels) in public agitation: a 
substantial body of articles appeared in various newspapers and journal favoring the claims of 
Bulgaria, and public meetings were held throughout the country as well in order to promote 
the Bulgarian adhesion to the Entente war aims. In the spring of 1915, Noel and Charles Ro-
den Buxton published a book, The War and the Balkans, in which they summarized their 
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views about the the general political situation in the Balkans, and also they evaluate the mili-
tary strength of each states too. In the first chapter of their book (‘The Balkans and the war’) 
the authors express their hope that, as the Entente mad  the principle of nationality its primary 
war objective, the settlement of the ‘Balkan problem’ on the basis of nationality would build 
up “a permanent fabric of peace”.45 Moreover, the Buxtons’ also argued that, from a military 
point of view, a re-instrumentalized Balkan bloc would meant additional 1.300.000 troops to 
the Entente forces which fact could be decisive in the course of the war.46 
The main purpose of the book was to emphasize the possibility of Balkan cooperation. 
After providing the reader the general characteristics of each Balkan country, the authors 
depicted the ‘rightful’ Bulgarian territorial claims. These territories, which Bulgaria consid-
ered for herself, were mainly ‘robbed’ from Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. They laid 
the claim for ‘Serbian Macedonia’, which technically covered those areas of Macedonia 
which were unconditionally allotted to Bulgaria by the Serbo–Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 
(but not the so-called contested zone). Besides this, t e Bulgarians wanted an outlet to the 
Aegean Sea at Kavala. In his private letters, Noel Buxton recurrently suggested this possi-
ble concession to the Foreign Office, as Eleftherios Venizelos, Greek prime minister at the 
time, tended to accept this in exchange for territorial gains in Asia Minor with the consent 
of the Entente.47 Bulgaria had claims for two other areas as well, both lost in the Second 
Balkan War, namely, Southern Dobrudja and Thrace (up to the Enos–Midia line).48 James 
David Bourchier, in a letter to Noel Buxton, outlined a scheme which included a territorial 
reorganization of the Balkans too. Bourchier suggests in this letter that cooperation between 
the Balkan states could only obtained by decisive Entente agency. First of all, the Entente 
would have to declare that it would support, on the on  hand, Serbia’s claim to Bosnia and 
Northern Herzegovina, and to one or two ports on the Adriatic; on the other hand, Monte-
negro’s claim to Southern Herzegovina and to Cattaro (Kotor), Budva and the district of 
Spizza (Sutomore) in Southern Dalmatia. Bulgaria could gain the desired territories if she 
would undertake a strictly benevolent neutral policy towards Serbia, Greece and Romania. 
As to Thrace, Bulgaria could have taken it in case sh would declare war on the Ottoman 
Empire.49 I think what is striking here, is the complete neglect of the Jugoslav solution of 
the ‘Balkan problem’, even if we know that at the time of publishing of the Buxtons’ book 
and presumably at the time of Bourchier letter, the Yugoslav Committee had not been es-
tablished yet. David Dutton noted with a dash of irny that the Buxtons’ attempted to de-
velop a “seductively simple programme of territorial earrangements designed to bring the 
whole peninsula to the allied camp”.50 Nevertheless, the Buxton brothers and their support-
ers were right on that the mediation of the Entente powers was a necessary requirement to 
facilitate the rapprochement of the Balkan countries. Lord Newton, an old comrade of Bux-
ton from the time of the Macedonian agitation campaign, emphasized this necessity in a let-
ter he wrote to Buxton. He stressed that if the Balkan states could not come to an agreement 
then the Entente ought to force them to do so. Regarding the work of the Foreign Office he 
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also added that “it seems to me that British diplomacy as regards the Balkans has never 
been so intensely futile before. Here we are, fighting he Turks and without getting any as-
sistance from the Turks’ natural enemies”.51 
With the exception of Lloyd George, the members of the British Cabinet showed less and 
less interest in the possibility of bringing in Bulgaria to the war on the allies’ side. Sir Edward 
Grey doubted this option from the very beginning, and lso feared that making promises in 
Sophia would destroy Serbian morale without any guarantee of real support or at least neutral-
ity from Bulgaria.52 On the other hand, Grey was more interested in securing Italian support 
than Bulgaria, and therefore the idea of forcing Serbia to make concessions to Bulgaria be-
came almost impossible for him, as Italian designs o  the east shore of the Adriatic con-
fronted Serbian (Jugoslav) territorial claims.53 Churchill and Lloyd George seemingly 
dropped the Bulgarian option as well, because they put their lot in the on-going great British 
offensive in the Dardanelles. Despite all of this, Noel Buxton could arrange two dinners at the 
Savoy Hotel with the Bulgarian Minister in London to discuss the conditions of the entry of 
Bulgaria to war but this could not change anything decisively.54 The British Cabinet still 
communicated contradictory: what Lloyd George promised on one day, Sir Edward Grey con-
futed on the other day. This uncertainty also made the Bulgarian Minister in London to con-
sider his resignation from his post. As I emphasized earlier, by the summer of 1915, British 
Cabinet members put their money on other horses: Grey hoped an all-pervading victory from 
the Italian entry and Churchill from the breakthrough at the Dardanelles. 
Conclusion 
Finally, Bulgaria entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers on 10th October 
1915. Behind this fateful decision there were several different reasons. First of all, the Cen-
tral Powers could offer more to Bulgaria without forcing any of their allies to make conces-
sions. On the other hand, by autumn it seemed that the German-led bloc would win the 
war.55 However, the history of the diplomatic scrambles in Bulgaria during this period also 
shed some light on the discrepancies of foreign policy making at least on two levels. First, 
from the papers of Noel Buxton it seems that the conflict between the Foreign Office and 
other branches of British administration caused serious problems when urgent decision-
making was needed. On the other hand, historical literature suggests that the joint diplo-
macy of the Entente did not work as smoothly as it was assumed before. 
Noel and Charles Roden Buxton’s mission to Bulgaria lso shed some light on both as-
pects. What is strikingly obvious from Noel Buxton’s paper is the ongoing struggle within 
the British political elite for power in the foreign policy decision-making process. In the 
long run, dissenters like the Buxtons were outmatched by other self-claimed foreign policy, 
                                                
51 MS 951 c.25/6 Balkans – Jan.–June 1915, Lord Newton to Noel Buxton, 6 May 1915. 
52 Grey, Twenty Five Years, 191. 
53 Robbins, British Diplomacy, 570. However, it is interesting to note that Grey in his recollections 
claims that he supported the scheme outlined by Noel Buxton about the possible territorial conces-
sions to Bulgaria, and he conducted his policy with the other Great Powers accordingly. Grey, Twenty 
Five Years, 199. 
54 Conwell-Evans, Foreign Policy, 109. 
55 Crampton, Bulgaria, 138. 
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more precisely: Balkan, experts who claimed their share in the re-shaping of this part of the 
world according to their sympathies and mostly biased presuppositions. 
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Tentatives diplomatiques britanniques aux Balkans dans les premières années de la 
Grande guerre (1914-1915) 
Les coups de feu fatals de Sarajevo ont poussé le continent européen entier en guerre à la 
fin de l’été 1914. Le rôle de l’Europe du Sud-Est n’était en même temps que secondaire, 
même pour les contemporains, vue l’ensemble de la Grande Guerre. De plus, il se trouve en 
position arriérée dans l’historiographie occidentale comparé aux événements qui se sont dé-
roulés au Front de l’Ouest ou au Front de l’Est. Les nouvelles recherches lancés à propos du 
centenaire consacrent, heureusement, une plus grande attention aussi à l’Europe du Sud-Est. 
Dans ma communication, je souhaite présenter les ambitions de la mission Buxton, préalables 
de l’entrée en guerre bulgare, en se basant sur l’héritage composé des écritures personnelles et 
les sources publiées. 
Les alliés opposants cherchaient, à partir de l’éclatement de la guerre, à faire entrer à la 
guerre des nouveaux participants de leur côté, ainsi ugmentant leur chance de victoire. La 
direction politique britannique a confié par cette raison Noel Buxton, le leader du Balkan 
Committee, et son frère, Charles Roden Buxton qu’ils utilisent l ur influence aux États balka-
niques et qu’ils aplanissent les divergences bulgares, grecques et serbes en les convaincant 
pour l’Entente. Pour la Grande-Bretagne, il était de grande importance de créer un certain 
bloc balkanique afin d’empêcher la relation entre les Empires centraux et l’Empire ottoman 
entrant en guerre de leur côté en automne 1914. Dans m  communication, je consacre une 
attention particulière aux propositions britanniques pour résoudre les contraints balkaniques. 
 
